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fiction theory
Abstract
The concept of "estrangement" has been central to sf criticism ever since Darko Suvin defined the genre
as creating the effect of "cognitive estrangement". By going back to the theories of Viktor Shklovsky
and Bertolt Brecht, I will show how Suvin, in his approach, intermingles formal, fictional, generic, and
receptive aspects of estrangement. Contrary to Suvin's assessment, it is not sf's primary formal operation
to render familiar things strange, but to make the alien look ordinary, a process I call naturalization. In




Things Made Strange: On the Concept of “Estrangement” in
Science Fiction Theory
The concept of estrangement has been significant for sf criticism ever since Darko
Suvin defined sf as the “genre of cognitive estrangement” in his Metamorphoses
of Science Fiction (1979).1 Although everyone seems to agree that sf renders the
content of its stories somehow “strange,” there are upon closer inspection
considerable differences in the way sf scholars make use of Suvin’s concept. This
is partly due to inconsistencies within Suvin’s own definition, which are
themselves a consequence of the vagueness of the concept of “estrangement”
before it was introduced into sf criticism. The idea of estrangement occupies a
prominent position in several aesthetic theories of the twentieth century. It was,
for example, central for Russian Formalism, as well as for Surrealism and for
various postmodern writers. The concept has been continually extended, so that
today estrangement is often regarded simply as a general artistic principle. In this
paper, I intend to restrict the meaning of estrangement, as far as sf is concerned,
by referring back to two of its significant theoreticians, Shklovsky and Brecht,
before re-evaluating Suvin’s definition. Since I am a scholar of film studies, I will
focus my analysis on sf movies; nonetheless, my insights should hold equally for
written sf.
Shklovsky and Brecht—Ostranenie and V-Effekt. In German, my native
language, “estrangement” is commonly translated as Verfremdung. Verfremdung
in turn can be translated into English in several ways, the three most popular
being “estrangement,”“defamiliarization,” and “alienation.” Each of these variant
translations has had consequences, as we shall see, since Suvin, who speaks
German fluently, draws heavily from such  German authors as Bertolt Brecht and
Ernst Bloch.2 In German-speaking discourse, the term Verfremdung is used by
two different theoretical traditions: for the concept of ostranenie as developed by
the Russian Formalist Viktor Shklovsky, and for Brecht’s concept of the
estranging effect, the so-called V-Effekt. Although these theoretical approaches
share similarities, they are by no means identical. Shklovsky in his 1917 essay Art
as Technique defines ostranenie as the breaking up of established habits of
reception. In daily life, we often perceive things only superficially—i.e., we do
not really see them the way they are. To truly see things again we must overcome
our “blind” perception, and this is only possible when they are made strange
again. This process of making things to appear strange is, according to Shklovsky,
the essential task of any kind of art.3
It is difficult to pin down the term ostranenie, however, because Shklovsky’s
definition is not very systematic. In fact, he describes several processes at
different levels. Firstly, he uses ostranenie to differentiate art from non-art. From
this perspective, ostranenie seems to be part of the perception process. Yet at the
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same time ostranenie is used to describe specific formal operations, such as
stylistic devices located at the level of the text, as for example the presence of
unusual narrative strategies. At a third level, ostranenie describes a process in the
history of art. In the course of time, a style once thought to be revolutionary will
become “normal” and thereby will be canonized. Subsequently things in turn are
made strange again, but only by a process of conscious departure from established
norms. According to Shklovsky, the history of art is a steady succession of
canonization and de-automatization.
At first glance, Brecht’s definition of Verfremdung seems almost identical to
Shklovsky’s ostranenie: “A representation which estranges is one which allows
us to recognize its subject, but at the same time makes it seem unfamiliar” (qtd
in Metamorphoses (6). Yet for Brecht, Verfremdung also has a strong didactic and
political meaning, and clearly is part of the audience’s perception. The V-Effekt
blocks empathy. In Brecht’s Epic Theater the spectator is not allowed to “delve”
into the play and is obstructed from regarding it as “natural.” Quite the contrary,
the action on stage—and by analogy the social order— should be rendered visible
as something artificial and man-made. In the logic of dialectical materialism, V-
Effekt should make an audience aware of sociopolitical processes (Jameson 58).
In contrast to Shklovsky, Brecht’s Verfremdung is not so much a general principle
of art as a specific didactic effect (Brooker 90). For Brecht, there are analogies
between estrangement and the scientific process; both are based on a naïve, fresh
look at the world, both take nothing for granted, and both ask why the current
situation is the way it is (Rülicke-Weiler 303). Brecht’s plea for a “theater of the
scientific age” has to be understood in this context.
When it comes to the question of what kind of response estrangement does or
should provoke in the reader, Shklovsky and Brecht differ fundamentally.4 For
Brecht, it is essential that estrangement leads to the realization that things do not
have to be the way they are, that any current state of things is not a natural given
but a product of historical processes, which can change and will be changed.
Shklovsky‘s project, by contrast, is ultimately a conservative one. For him, the
task of art is not to reveal things as results of a historical process but as eternal:
Things are as they are, and art seems to be called upon to reveal through
estrangement their genuine character—not to change them or the social settings
in which they occur. Any successful act of estrangement thus rests on a paradox:
The end product is meant as a piece of innovation—arrived at through various
artistic devices—that serves, however, to revive and make more palpable the old
(and constant) substance of things. To conduct the procedure of estrangement
properly and to the desired end means to bring the old to the fore in and through
the new, thus reasserting what is presumed to be the object’s timeless substance.
(Tihanov 686)
Despite their different goals, both Shklovsky and Brecht see and use estrangement
mainly as a stylistic device that describes how fiction is being communicated.
Shklovsky specifically mentions unusual verbal imagery, while Brecht names
concrete operations, such as a distanced kind of acting or placing banners above
the stage—two exemplary strategies for breaking the illusion of realism.
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Suvin refers explicitly to Shklovsky and Brecht, but without distinguishing
properly between these two theoretical traditions. Instead, he introduces the term
estrangement in a completely new realm when using it to designate a genre: “In
sf the attitude of estrangement … has grown into the formal framework of the
genre” (Metamorphoses 7; emphasis in original).5
This central point of Suvin’s poetics is full of contradictions, and it is worth
analyzing it in detail to disentangle the different aspects of Suvin’s concept. For
all their differing attitudes regarding the question of what task estrangement
should serve, for both Shklovsky and Brecht estrangement has been primarily a
stylistic device that can be located at specific points inside “realistic” texts.
Suvin, however, suddenly calls it the formal framework of estranged genres,
which are comprised of sf, the fairy tale, and myth, and which he opposes to
naturalistic ones.
This is not only a completely new usage of the term “estrangement,” but a
problematic one. One of the elementary insights of Russian Formalism has been
that so-called “realistic” texts also regularly make use of estranging effects
(Parrinder 37). From a formalist’s point of view, Suvin’s opposition between
estranged and naturalistic fiction is quite questionable, to say the least. 
The opposition between Suvin’s theory and the formalist’s ostranenie arises
because in his concept of estrangement Suvin intermingles different aspects. He
fuses the ontology of the fictional world with the formal devices a text employs
to present its world. For Suvin, estrangement has to be applied to both fictional
and formal aspects. Although he writes of the “formal framework” of a genre and,
moreover, quotes Brecht’s definition of Verfremdung, estrangement clearly is not
a purely formal device for Suvin. If he were truly following Brecht (“A
representation which estranges is one which allows us to recognize its subject, but
at the same time makes it seem unfamiliar” [32]), this would mean that sf and
fantasy are constantly making their marvelous elements appear strange.6 This is,
of course, not true. Although “unrealistic” characters populate fairy tales, they are
not “strange” in the sense of Shklovsky or Brecht. They are not constructed to
surprise—on the contrary, witches and fairies and the like are expected—and
hence they do not serve to de-automatize or to make strange whatever is
happening in the story. Ostranenie and Verfremdung are both based on the idea
of turning the common into the unfamiliar, but fairies or talking animals are not
at all common. They do not have referents in empirical reality. Moreover, the
fairy tale is, in Shklovsky’s sense, one of the most canonized genres. Although
ostranenie and Verfremdung are ambiguous concepts, both primarily designate
rhetorical strategies. Suvin, however, uses estrangement to characterize the
relation between the fictional and empirical worlds—in this sense, an estranged
fictional world is a world containing marvelous elements, elements which are not
(yet) part of the world we live in.
In sf, all kinds of marvelous things may happen. People can travel in time,
exceed the speed of light, and do many other things that, according to our present
knowledge, we will never achieve in the real world. Contrary to Suvin’s
definition, these marvelous acts are not presented in an estranged way; rather they
are rationalized and made plausible. In a fairy tale, an evil witch can wave her
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magic wand and make people disappear. Judging by our empirical world this is
no more realistic than the idea of teleportation as we know it thanks to Star Trek.
Still, we have no problem at all identifying which “magical” disappearance
belongs to the world of the fairy tale and which to sf. This is because sf employs
an aesthetics of technology and tries to naturalize its nova. A witch is
unquestionably part of the fairy tale iconography, while such machines and
devices as in Star Trek, for example, look technical; they are visual extrapolations
of tools we use in everyday life. It is not so much the technical possibility of
“beaming” that identifies Star Trek as sf—since “beaming” is technically
impossible (so far)—but rather its techno-scientific look. The formal framework
of sf is not estrangement, but exactly its opposite, naturalization. On a formal
level, sf does not estrange the familiar, but rather makes the strange familiar.
According to Patrick Parrinder, “[f]or Suvin … estrangement in fiction is first
and foremost a matter of choosing a plot that is non-realistic in the sense that it
is determined by the novum” (39). Parrinder’s interpretation does not really make
sense, either, because what the novum shapes primarily is the world of the story.
It follows that the plot is also influenced by the novum; however, what gets
estranged in sf—in Suvin’s sense—is not the plot (or the story), but the fictional
universe. In other words: story and plot can only be “non-realistic” because they
unfold in a marvelous universe that differs from the one we live in. Suvin’s (and
also Parrinder’s) problem is that the classical narratological triad of plot, story,
and style does not actually describe the world a story takes place in. Somehow,
the fictional world has to be part of it implicitly, because the story cannot take
place in a vacuum; but, ultimately, the fictional world is not something formalistic
that narratology truly cares about. Formalism, as well as structuralism, both have
a blind spot when it comes to fictional worlds; they do not provide proper tools
to describe the ontology of a fictional universe. This is a major source of
confusion in Suvin’s theory, because he constantly speaks of the formal
framework and he continuously employs formal categories to describe what is
clearly an aspect of the ontology of the fictional world.
It becomes obvious that Suvin uses estrangement differently from his
predecessors when we look at his comparison of Brecht’s work with sf: “In sf, the
attitude of estrangement—used by Brecht in a different way, within a still
predominantly ‘realistic’ context—has grown into the formal framework of the
genre” (Metamorphoses 7; emphasis in original). This enigmatic sentence shows
Suvin’s difficulties in fusing Brecht and sf. Brecht does not fit into the
naturalistic/estranged opposition Suvin established, and so Suvin is forced to
introduce the term “realistic,” which he will not use later, and whose exact
meaning remains unclear.7 Obviously, Brecht’s plays employ modes of
estrangement; but they neither belong to sf nor to a related genre; they are part of
a “realistic context.” This means that when it comes to Brecht, “estranged”
probably does not describe the characteristics of the fictional world, since there
are no marvelous elements in his plays. In absolute opposition to what Suvin
claims, it is actually in Brecht‘s works that estrangement functions as a formal
framework.
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Cognition, Cognition Effect, and Naturalization. So far, I have not mentioned
Suvin’s concept of “cognition,” which in his view is also essential for defining sf.
It is precisely the combination of estrangement and cognition that sets sf off from
other estranged genres. As with estrangement, Suvin applies cognition to rather
different things. In the preface of Metamorphoses, he writes that sf must be
“perceived as not impossible with the cognitive (cosmological and
anthropological) norms of the author’s epoch” (Metamorphoses viii). In the same
paragraph, he also asserts that sf is “a realistic irreality, with humanized
nonhumans, this-worldly Other Worlds and so forth” (Metamorphoses viii). Here
cognition seems to mean that the novum, despite its marvelous character, is
rendered as possible—“this-worldly.” The emphasis lies on appearance and
perception; the novum must appear as cognitive. In other words, cognition here
seems to be identical with what I call naturalization. This is also in line with the
approach of Carl Freedman, who speaks of a “cognition effect” rather than of
“cognition” as such: “The crucial issue for generic discrimination is not any
epistemological judgment external to the text itself on the rationality or
irrationality of the latter’s imaginings, but rather ... the attitude of the text itself
to the kind of estrangements being performed” (18).
Up to this point, cognition seems to be mainly a formal category, but for
Suvin, there is more at stake. Since sf appears as this-worldly, it implies—
contrary to fantasy or the fairy tale—a connection with the empirical reality of the
reader. It follows from this that “sf sees the norms of any age, including
emphatically its own, as unique, changeable” (Metamorphoses 7); in other words,
sf is constantly historicizing its worlds—it is the materialist genre par
excellence—which explains why the declared Marxist Suvin is so attracted to it.
In this sense, cognition is even more a part of the perceptual process; it actually
becomes an activity of the reader. Suvin, again, does not properly distinguish
between the properties of a text and their (desired) effect(s). For him, the elicited
cognitive effect in a reader and the formal means by which this is achieved seem
to be identical (at least, they both fall under the term of “cognition”).
Suvin’s use of cognition is also somewhat tautological. As I noted above, for
Brecht the goal of estrangement is to let things appear as historically produced
and changeable—and any properly estranged work of art should achieve this
cognitive effect (see also Parrinder 40). Aside from that, Suvin’s and Brecht’s
concepts almost match at this point (they both aim at historicizing and de-
naturalizing the present), but they try to achieve their goals by different, if not
quite opposite, means.  Brecht’s plays estrange the normal, while sf naturalizes
the strange.
In the first chapter of Metamorphoses, cognition seems to include formal and
receptive aspects, and Suvin says explicitly that cognition should not be confused
with “scientific vulgarization or even technological prognostication”
(Metamorphoses 9). Clearly, this is targeted at the more fannish approaches that
try to define sf by its allegedly inherent scientific quality. Later in the book, Suvin
seems to alter his position. Suddenly, he demands that the “novum is postulated
and validated by the post-Cartesian and post-Baconian scientific method”
(Metamorphoses 64-65; emphasis in original). In my understanding, this stands
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in direct contradiction to his earlier definition of cognition and, moreover,
manifests a kind of relapse into a naïve fan position. Although Suvin is quick to
add that this “does not mean that the novelty is primarily a matter of scientific
facts” (Metamorphoses 65), the question remains as to what else it could mean.
Of course, Suvin is aware that sf can be completely unscientific and he even
quotes Kingsley Amis, who states that the novum is based “in science or
technology, or pseudo-science or pseudo-technology” (Metamorphoses 65).
Nevertheless, a pseudoscientific look alone is not enough for Suvin;  sf also needs
to indicate “the presence of scientific cognition as the sign of or correlative of a
method (way, approach, atmosphere, sensibility) identical to that of a modern
philosophy of science” (Metamorphoses 65).
Gregory Renault rightly complains that “[t]he tough-sounding references to
‘validation’ by the ‘scientific method’ are never explained, much less
documented” (119). It is not clear at all what Suvin means by “presence of
scientific cognition.” Is it a quality of the fictional world or does it describe the
inner workings of the novum? Does Suvin here only want to say that because sf
naturalizes the novum it also implies a scientific-technological world-view, and
therefore is connected to the empirical world? If only the latter is intended, then
his rhetoric seems quite overblown.
In his definition, Suvin short-circuits different kinds of estrangement in sf.
There are probably several reasons for this. One must not forget that Suvin was
in fact one of the first academics to take sf seriously and therefore needed to
legitimize the object of his research. This may well be the reason why he resorts
to Shklovsky, although the concept of ostranenie does not fit Suvin’s project at
all. Also, he is hindered by the fact that formalism does not provide a proper
framework to describe fictional worlds. Thus, the references to Brecht serve to
bring sf into the realms of “high literature.” Suvin and Brecht also have similar
goals. They both are interested in estrangement as a means of critical—i.e.,
socialist—examination of the present. The fact that Brecht sees estrangement as
a quasi-scientific procedure is an additional bonus.
Another point in Suvin’s agenda is directed more at the sf community: Suvin
wants to delimit “real” sf to a small set of texts with critical impetus. His
definition is also meant as a “proof” that most books sold under the sf label do not
count as part of the genre. Suvin tries to ban myths, fairy tales, and pulp sf from
cognitive literature, but at the same time he tries to include such early utopian
novels and satires as Gulliver’s Travels (see Renault 131). This is probably the
reason for his ambiguous use of cognition. On the one hand, sf only has to appear
as cognitive (otherwise there would not be any room for, e.g., H.G. Wells), but
at the same time it has to be validated by the “Post-Baconian method,” or else
even the most ludicrous space opera would fit into the genre.8 
Diegetic Estrangement. So far, I have demonstrated that estrangement is not the
primary formal directive of sf. Nevertheless, estrangement is not entirely alien to
the genre. Sf frequently produces an effect that is at least analogous to it. Whether
there are creatures (human or of other species) traveling in time or to unknown
planets, or new inventions that change the face of the earth, or hideous monsters
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on a rampage—whenever a marvelous element is introduced into a seemingly
realistic world, a collision occurs between two systems of reality, producing an
estranging effect. The familiar appears in new surroundings and is thereby re-
contextualized.
As an example, I will analyze a scene from Richard Fleischer’s Soylent Green
(1973). In the year 2022 overpopulation has become the main problem of New
York City. The city is utterly overcrowded and natural food is so rare that people
must eat synthetic food. In this setting, the main protagonist Thorn is investigating
a case of homicide in a luxury apartment. With almost ecstatic joy, he opens the
faucet, runs the water over his hands, and smells the soap: “[He] is so entranced
with the taken-for-granted sensual pleasures of a middle class bathroom that it is
impossible to look at the bathroom in the film as a familiar place” (Sobchack
132). Thus, a quite prosaic and totally common room is transformed by
estrangement into a place of pure joy; the audience realizes their (unconscious)
daily luxury. 
It is this kind of “making strange” that Suvin probably has in mind in the term
“estrangement,” yet it is based on a principle different from Shklovsky’s and
Brecht’s concepts. The bathroom in Soylent Green is not estranged formally.
There is no surprising editing, there are no unusual camera angles. The whole
scene is filmed in one shot; the camera work is quite unobtrusive and functional.
It is essentially Thorn’s behavior that creates the effect of estrangement. Without
his exuberant joy, the scene would hardly appear strange. The effect of
estrangement in Soylent Green derives from the character’s behavior and is
therefore part of the diegesis, the fictional world; it arises because Thorn acts
unusually in what appears to be a realistic world.
When Suvin writes about estrangement, he usually does not mean ostranenie,
but diegetic estrangement, the collision of contradicting elements on the level of
the story. Such incidents of collision may be produced via unexpected character
reactions (such as Thorn’s in Soylent Green), or by the introduction of
“impossible images,” such as, for example, ships stranded in a desert in Close
Encounters of the Third Kind (1977). In the second example, again estrangement
does not arise from a formal operation, but from the fact that these ships are
where they cannot be—a fact that is illustrated realistically.
The concept of estrangement is not the formal framework of sf—and Suvin
actually says so himself when he states that “[t]he effect of such factual reporting
of fictions is one of confronting a set normative system … with a point of view
implying a new set of norms” (Metamorphoses 6; emphasis added). “Factual
reporting of fictions” is merely another way of saying “naturalizing the
marvelous,” and when Suvin speaks of “a new set of norms” he obviously is not
referring to formal aspects (how the story is told), but to fictional ones (the rules
governing a fictional world). Therefore, in sf, the effect of estrangement does not
arise only from making things strange, but from the naturalization of the
marvelous.9
Suvin extends Shklovsky’s already broad concept of estrangement to include
all aspects that are, in his opinion, central to sf: fictional, stylistic-formal, and
generic ones. Thus, for him, estrangement denominates the following six aspects:
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• The nature of the fictional world, first in terms of its relationship to our
empirical reality, and then
• deriving from that, the genre of the respective film/text; then, further,
• a formal process justifying the novum, the naturalization of the marvelous,
and
• the opposite process: making the familiar strange, and,
• an analogous process on the fictional level, making things strange on the
level of the story, while
• both processes serve the same goal, which is the de-automatization of
perception, the seeing of the familiar anew.
It is essential to restrict Suvin’s ambiguous notion of estrangement and to
distinguish its different aspects. Firstly, we have to get rid of Suvin’s estranged
genres; here, “estranged” can easily be replaced with “marvelous.” Suvin’s use
is prone to cause misunderstandings and hence does not carry any advantage.
Next, we must differentiate between the formal and the fictional processes that
can be employed in creating an estranging effect. The process of normalizing the
alien I call naturalization, while the formal-rhetorical act of making the familiar
strange (in Shklovsky’s sense) will be named defamiliarization. For estrangement
on the level of the story, I introduce the term of diegetic estrangement, and for the
receptive aspect (that is, the effect on the audience) just estrangement.
Consequently, in sf, estrangement can be achieved in two ways, by means of
defamiliarization or by diegetic estrangement.10
Suvin’s definition does not distinguish between fictional, stylistic-formal, and
receptive aspects, but until we differentiate these levels, we cannot answer the
question whether and how sf estranges its content. It is not enough to, for
example, define estrangement simply as “a rhetorical effect created by the use of
specific stylistic devices,” as Philippe Mather does (187). This should be obvious
when examining Mather’s own examples: the deserted cities in Omega Man
(1961) or On the Beach (1959) seem strange and creepy not because its
inhabitants have been made invisible by “specific stylistic devices,” but because
the sites have been actually abandoned.
Diegetic Estrangement and Defamiliarization. The distinctions among
naturalization, defamiliarization, and diegetic estrangement lies at the very heart
of sf. In the following passages, I will concentrate on the relationship between
naturalization and defamiliarization, sketching briefly how they interact.
Naturalization is the basic formal process noticeable in sf. Like defamiliarization,
it is located on a formal level (in contrast to diegetic estrangement, which is a
fictional phenomenon on the level of the story). Still, diegetic estrangement and
naturalization are closely linked; the novum must have been naturalized before
diegetic estrangement can take place. Cognitively, diegetic estrangement comes
into play at a later stage than naturalization (and defamiliarization). First, sf
depicts the novum as compatible with our world; then, an estranging effect can
only follow when the viewer becomes aware of some recontextualization.
Defamiliarization, on the other hand, is a purely formal phenomenon.
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I will illustrate the interaction between these mechanisms with an example of
the popular motif of a change in scale. In The Incredible Shrinking Man (1957)
the body of the protagonist shrinks after radioactive contamination. The drastic
change in size lets familiar objects of our daily life appear in a completely
different light. To the “Tom Thumb”-like protagonist, an ordinary house becomes
a dangerous trap. First a cat and later a spider are suddenly threatening menaces,
and a doll’s house seems to be the only safe place.
What The Incredible Shrinking Man demonstrates has, at first glance, nothing
to do with defamiliarization. The altered dimensions are not a formal device in
Shklovsky’s sense, a rhetorical procedure that renders the familiar strange. When
Tolstoy describes a Napoleonic battle in an unusual way (to cite one of
Shklovsky’s examples), he does not change the object of his description. A battle
remains a battle even if it is delineated in an unconventional way. The tiny
protagonist in The Incredible Shrinking Man, on the other hand, is no longer a
“normal” man shown in an unusual way. In this movie, estrangement takes place
on the level of the story, and the special formal trick is that this shrinking is
presented “realistically.”
Although sf is primarily based on naturalizing the marvelous, however,
defamiliarization is not unknown to the genre. Many familiar objects are rendered
strange in The Incredible Shrinking Man. Furniture appears enormous, a cat
appears suddenly as a gigantic monster, and a nail is employed as a lance to battle
a spider. At first sight, these examples may appear as paradigmatic of
defamiliarization, but there is one crucial difference from Shklovsky’s examples.
In The Incredible Shrinking Man, objects only appear strange because the movie
adopts the perspective of its protagonist; it focalizes on his point of view.11 The
audience shares the main character’s perspective and not that of a (more or less)
neutral narrator or a non-marvelous character. We would not see any gigantic
furniture, nor a “monster”-cat, if it were not for the film’s point of focalization,
which is the shrunken person. If, for example, we were to share the point of view
of his (not radioactively contaminated) fiancée, we would merely see a tiny man
in familiar domestic surroundings.
The unusual point of view is possible because the film has completed its
naturalization, and hence the audience has accepted the novum. The movie
focalizes on and/or through the naturalized novum. This focalization can be
understood as a part of sf’s rhetorical strategy. The film “behaves as if” its novum
were normal and plausible, and it does so not only on the “superficial” level of its
technological aesthetics, but also on the narrative level. The narration accepts the
novum as well and takes its point of view, thereby performing a narrative
naturalization.
The result of this narrative naturalization could be called a second-degree
defamiliarization, which only comes into effect after a successful naturalization
has taken place. This kind of defamiliarization that follows from diegetic
estrangement is far more frequent in sf than “normal,” primary defamiliarization.
This is also true for Sobchack’s example of Soylent Green. If an apple, a piece of
meat, or fresh water from the tap are rendered strange by the camera’s unusual
lingering, this is again an example of second-degree defamiliarization. The
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narration is focalized on the protagonist, and together, they marvel at the various
miracles.
The interaction between naturalization and defamiliarization can result in
different forms. The most extreme instance of naturalization is achieved when a
film shows the subjective point of view of an alien being. Mather lists several
exemplary movies: Westworld (1973), RoboCop (1987), and Predator (1987);
there are other examples, such as The Terminator (1984), Alien3 (1992), and, of
course, 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), in which we regularly “see” the action
from HAL’s point of view. A variant is the view through an insect’s compound
eye, as in The Fly (1958) and Phase IV (1974). In all these examples, the
narration is completely focalized through the novum; we literally see with strange
eyes.
First-degree defamiliarization, which is not based on a naturalized novum, is
far rarer in sf; it even contradicts the genre in certain ways. If the novum is not
naturalized, but made strange, sf’s central device—rendering the marvelous
possible—is made obsolete. This is, in my opinion, the reason why sf generally
prefers a non-experimental mode of narration,12 what David Bordwell calls
classical narration. Most non-classical modes of narration try to defamiliarize the
story, and this conflicts with sf’s tendency to naturalize—the result would be a
“defamiliarized estrangement.”
Most of the time, first-degree defamiliarization does not appear in pure form,
but is used to support diegetic estrangement. Letters From a Dead Man (1986),
for example, shows a somber post-doomsday world where people vegetate in
contaminated ruins. The film features many examples of diegetic estrangement,
among them the puny Christmas tree towards the end—arid branches decorated
with wire and candle stumps. This does not count as a formally defamiliarized
image of an ordinary Christmas tree, but as its poor imitation. Yet besides those
moments of diegetic estrangement, Letters from a Dead Man also employs
defamiliarization. The whole movie is tinted a dirty brown-yellow, which in
interior scenes is sometimes interchanged with a sickly blue hue. This clearly is
an example of defamiliarization: the picture is formally made strange, but the hue
is not meant to indicate that the world of the movie is actually monochrome.
Rather, it underscores the morbid and degenerated character of the deserted city
on a formal level (the same operation is used in Lars von Trier’s The Element of
Crime [1984]). The Angry Red Planet (1959) uses the same technique (the scenes
on Mars are tinted red), but for a different result. Although the red color also
provokes an estranging effect, this time it is an instance of diegetic estrangement.
The red hue is meant to visualize the light on the Red Planet, therefore the color
is diegetic. In Phase IV we meet a third variant. Here, the landscape is covered
with a yellow insecticide. Although all three examples exhibit the coloring of a
scene, each one is different. In Phase IV, the color is part of the profilmic reality,
the landscape is painted yellow, while in the two other movies the film stock was
colorized later.
In Letters from a Dead Man, defamiliarization is employed to support diegetic
estrangement, while in Phase IV defamiliarization is used to create diegetic
estrangement in the first place. As this is rather rare, I will analyze this example
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in more detail. In the only feature film by Saul Bass, the story is about mutated
intelligent ants that try to take over the world. In contrast with other sf movies
populated with mutated insects (including Tarantula [1954], Them! [1955], The
Beginning of the End [1957], or The Deadly Mantis [1957]), the ants in Phase IV
appear unchanged. They are still tiny insects, which distinguish themselves from
the “normal” type only by their unusual intelligence. Since ants cannot be trained,
and as artificial ants would not have been a convincing substitute in the mid-
1970s, the filmmakers had to film common ants following more or less their
normal routines. In the film, many scenes are shot with extreme macro lenses as
we know them from educational movies. Unlike in most documentaries, the ants
of Phase IV are deliberately being staged like human beings. An uncanny score
and unnatural, almost expressionistic, lighting suggest that these little creatures
are up to something. Early in the movie, members of different ant species meet
and “discuss” their strategy. At this point, the film cuts between close-ups of the
various heads (in the shot/reverse-shot-tradition of a “conventional” dialogue
scene), and thereby suggests that these insects actually are communicating. We
do not hear their “talk,” of course, except for some chirping noises, but still, the
editing of the scene and the “gesticulating” tentacles of the ants render the
impression that a lively discussion is taking place. Overall, the ants in Phase IV
rarely behave in an unusual way: they just do the things ants normally would do.
Still, Phase IV manages—by applying such formal devices as close-ups, lighting,
music, and editing to produce a specific effect—to leave the impression that they
are far from normal. This is a paradigmatic example of defamiliarization, which,
in this case, does not make us see the ants anew, but rather seems to be changing
them. In Bass’s movie, defamiliarization does not result in the de-automatization
of our perception, but rather in creating a deception.
Diegetic estrangement and defamiliarization can also coexist without much
interference. In John Frankenheimer’s Seconds (1960), Arthur, a well-situated
man in his fifties, gets the chance to exchange his absolutely average existence
with a life of his choice. A mysterious organization offers him the opportunity to
lead a new life with a new identity and a changed physical appearance.
Everything seems to work out perfectly; still, Arthur—who is now called Tony
and looks now “like” Rock Hudson—cannot get used to this new life. He
understands that all his new friends belong to the organization, too. He is part of
a big charade and still no closer to fulfilling his “true self.”
The title sequence of Seconds shows Tony in close-ups; he is being filmed
with extreme wide-angle lenses and thus appears grotesquely distorted,
nonhuman, and strange. This intro is a case of defamiliarization in its purest form.
One of the most familiar objects, the human face, suddenly seems scary and
strange—indeed, we do see this face anew. Apart from the opening sequence,
Seconds is (for the most part) filmed in a sober, rather flat black and white. There
are no spectacular special effects; the novum is completely naturalized. The
radical change in the protagonist’s appearance is depicted as a large but normal
medical operation—although at the end, when Tony realizes what will happen to
him, again extreme wide-angle shots are used. These moments remain exceptions,
however. Normality rules, and it is precisely this normality from which the
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movie’s effect stems. An audience—and, after a while, Tony, too—understands
that here nothing is truly “normal.” In this movie, nothing is as it appears; even
Tony’s best friends and his lover are part of an immense setup. Finally, Tony is
totally estranged from himself. He understands that he does not know who he
actually is, that he does not have any idea of what he wants, and that all his
decisions have been controlled by unknown forces. 
In Seconds, defamiliarization and diegetic estrangement alternate and
complement each other. In the title sequence, the human body is portrayed as
strangely as possible. Yet, since the titles are not really part of the diegesis, this
does not interfere with the fictional world but rather acts as a commentary on a
meta level. This is the film itself speaking, so to say, and there is no danger of a
collision between defamiliarization and naturalization, since the film has not yet
established its fictional world. The underlying message in this beginning, though,
is clear enough: man is estranged from himself. The story of the film further
illustrates this. Man is not only estranged from his body, but also from his social
existence. His wishes and hopes turn out to be poor delusions. Seconds is an
example of how a merely formal defamiliarization can be continued on the
fictional level.
Defamiliarized Estrangement. In Phase IV and Angry Red Planet,
defamiliarization serves to create diegetic estrangement, while in Seconds these
two processes are kept apart. The combination of first-degree defamiliarization
and diegetic estrangement in the same scene, on the other hand, is rare, since sf
depends on naturalization. A defamiliarized estrangement would put the genre’s
realistic illusion in jeopardy. While there are some movies with isolated scenes
that combine both devices, there are almost no examples where this is maintained
throughout a whole movie. A film that mixes the processes from time to time is
George Lucas’s first feature film, THX 1138 (1971). Here, we encounter a
sequence in a kind of prison, which is a seemingly endless room without walls,
floor, or ceiling. Everything is white; even the characters are dressed in white and
their heads are shaved.
There are other sf movies that feature rooms kept completely white, for
example Mission to Mars (2000) and The Matrix (1999). Compared with these
two later movies, THX 1138 is more radical, since it deliberately violates
Hollywood’s rules regarding frame composition and “invisible” editing. Some
shots seem almost “empty,” with characters only partly visible at the edge of the
frame. In other shots, the people in the foreground are photographed out of focus
with the speaking character concealed. It is already quite difficult to keep a sense
of orientation in such borderless rooms, but on top of this, the editing adds to the
instability: the film jumps from shot to shot, frequently breaking the rules of the
180N line and of continuity editing. Such “arbitrary” editing, in combination with
the white frames, is highly disorienting and disturbing. The audience has almost
no point of reference and soon feels completely lost. Only a few scenes of THX
1138 are staged this way, however. This is no surprise, since such a highly
disorienting style makes it difficult to tell a story. Hence, when it is important that
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the (quite conventional) plot should be understood, the film’s narration returns to
a “normal”—that is, conventional—style. 
What is considered conventional—or what David Bordwell calls
classical—narration is not a static entity, however. Many of the formal and
narrational gimmicks common in today’s blockbusters would have been regarded
as impossible in the Hollywood of the 1940s or 1950s. This also holds true for sf
film, although sf is quite conservative compared to the Hollywood mainstream.
Event Horizon (1997) and Fantastic Four (2005), for example, both use the
combination of zoom with reverse traveling known as Vertigo effect. This effect
results in a highly visible change in the frame’s geometry and is an example of
defamiliarization. In both movies, the vertigo effect is used to depict processes of
the psyche—there is no direct conflict with the naturalization of a novum.
Something analogous would have been impossible in an sf movie of the 1950s.
There is a tendency in today’s sf movies towards a defamiliarization that has
no diegetic motivation. An exemplary film is The Matrix (1999), probably the
most influential sf movie of the last decade. For the main part of the movie,
defamiliarizing special effects serve to depict the fictional world in a nevertheless
plausible way. Early on, a kind of electronic insect is surgically removed from the
main protagonist’s—Neo’s—belly button. Soon afterwards, he touches a mirror,
which then turns liquid. This is a standard use of special effects; they supply a
setting that would have been impossible to create otherwise.
One of The Matrix’s most spectacular special effects is the so-called bullet
time effect. Here, a scene is slowed down or even brought to halt, so that we can
view motions and actions that are too fast to notice under normal circumstances,
as for example a flying bullet (hence the name). At the same time, although time
is on hold, the camera stays in motion and moves inside the frozen scenery. The
Matrix uses this effect in different ways. The scene in which Neo dodges flying
bullets is “classical.” Here, a highly defamilarizing effect is used to depict a fact
possible only inside the fictional world—Neo possesses superpowers that enable
him to evade bullets. Completely different is a scene at the film’s beginning,
when Trinity “freezes” during a fight with a cop. The action stops, Trinity “floats”
in mid-air without moving, while the camera turns a half circle around her.
Although both scenes make use of the same effect, there is a considerable
difference. In the bullet-dodging scene, Neo is still moving; the slowing down of
the action is only needed to show how fast his movements have become. In the
Trinity scene, neither she nor the cop are moving; everything has come to a stop,
and only the camera moves. If this were meant to be a diegetic effect, it would
mean that time had stopped in the scene—which would not make sense in the
story. Here, the bullet time effect has no diegetic motivation; it is employed to
baffle the audience and to display the level of technical expertise used in the film.
Defamiliarization and diegetic estrangement begin to blend in The Matrix.
What the film does is “against the rules”—to use the same effect for diegetic
estrangement and defamiliarization. What at first appears to be an identical
device—time stops—are in fact two different things in this fictional world. I am
not suggesting that The Matrix is the first movie to do this, but the film’s
immense box-office success has definitely helped to soften the “unspoken” law
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that previously forbade the mixing of defamiliarization and diegetic estrangement.
Slipstream (2005), for example, shows similar tendencies. The film’s protagonist
owns a kind of time machine that enables him to rewind actions as with a VCR’s
remote control. To illustrate this, the film uses various effects: whole shots or
parts of a scene freeze, and some scenes are rewound in fast motion. Besides
those diegetically-motivated manipulations of time, Slipstream also employs
techniques of defamiliarization that have no real diegetic motivation. During a
shoot-out, for example, the camera starts to spin and shows the combatants, who,
together with the background, gradually start to blur. In the end, all we can see is
the background changing behind static characters. From the perspective of the
story, this makes no sense, since none of the protagonists are moving during the
shooting. In a later scene, the two main characters are having a conversation,
which is depicted in an unusual parallel montage. The film jumps between two
locations—the inside of a car and a few steps in front of it—while the dialogue
goes on without any interruption. Here, a conversation is taking place at two
locations at two different times. This scene could be taken as a marker that time
has come out of joint inside the diegetic world. If that were the case, however, it
would only be visible for the audience and not for the protagonists. Consequently,
the film uses defamiliarization, but is not depicting a diegetic fact with it. At the
end, this is brought to the extreme when the credits are first shown in fast motion,
then rewound and shown again at normal speed.
Conclusion. I have shown that terms that seem commonly accepted, upon closer
inspection often display quite a broad variety of meanings. This holds especially
true for the term “estrangement.” Shklovsky, Brecht, Bloch, and Suvin all write
about estrangement, yet they all mean different things by it. While Shklovsky’s
ostranenie is primarily a formal operation, Suvin’s estrangement denotes a
phenomenon on the level of the story—although he himself does not seem to fully
realize that. The aim of this article is to show that such distinctions are not signs
of pure academical finickiness, but, on the contrary, point to the very core of sf.
The interactions among naturalization, defamiliarization, and diegetic
estrangement are vital for the way sf works and how it affects an audience, and
I believe my distinctions can aid a better understanding of the genre.13
NOTES
This paper presents a condensed version of a chapter of my PhD thesis on science fiction
film, which is available as Die Konstitution des Wunderbaren. Zu einer Poetik des
Science-Fiction-Films. I am grateful to Daniela Casanova for her help with the translation.
1. Personally, I prefer to speak of sf not as a genre but as a fictional-aesthetic mode.
While a genre is an historic entity, a term used at a specific time by certain actors to
delineate a related cluster of films and texts, a mode is an abstract and at least partly
ahistorical concept, which traverses times, countries, styles, and media. For the sake of
simplicity, however, I will employ the term “genre” in this paper.
2. It is even more complicated since Brecht, in his early writings, uses the term
Entfremdung, and only later changes to Verfremdung (Rülicke-Weiler 307). Entfremdung
—commonly translated as “alienation”—is an important term in Marxist theory. Marx,
following Hegel, argues that in capitalist society, the worker is alienated from his
383THINGS MADE STRANGE
work—and, ultimately, also from his fellow human beings, and even from himself
—because he no longer produces for himself but is reduced to a replaceable link in the
chain of production.
3. For my assessment of Shklovsky’s ostranenie I draw heavily from essays by Renate
Lachmann (1970) and Frank Kessler (1996), both of which are available only in German.
Although Shklovsky is generally regarded as a representative of Russian formalism, he
stands in many ways outside the formalist project. He was not actually interested in
literature as a system, and his concept of ostranenie was never fully adopted by theorists
such as Iurii Tynianov or Roman Jakobson (Lachmann 237–44; Tihanov 667-68).
4. Some authors believe that Brecht was directly influenced by Shklovsky during his
travel to Russia in 1935, but this claim seems to be largely unfounded (Lachmann 246–48;
Tihanov 687-88, note 42). 
5. Suvin follows Ernst Bloch in his understanding of Verfremdung. For Bloch, “the
real function of estrangement is—and must be—the provision of a shocking and distancing
mirror above the only too familiar reality; the purpose of the mirroring is to arouse both
amazement and concern” (125). Bloch is closer to Brecht than to Shklovsky, since
estrangement for him also can lead to a critical insight, but he conceptualizes it as a
general principle that is not limited to formal aspects. Furthermore, Bloch distinguishes
between “estrangement” (understood as a general effect) and “alienation” (understood as
Marxist Entfremdung). For our purposes, such a distinction is not helpful, since Bloch
does not differentiate between formal and diegetic “estrangement,” but describes it in a
most general way.
6. I adopt Tzvetan Todorov’s nomenclature, which he developed in his study The
Fantastic (1975). Todorov distinguishes between three types of genre, the uncanny, the
fantastic, and the marvelous, the latter designating fictional worlds that are not compatible
with our empirical world. Like Suvin, Todorov is not always clear in his definitions,
because he understands these genres as formal categories, although they primarily
designate the ontology of the fictional world: these categories point out not so much how
a story is narrated, but rather the way a fictional world is being organized and how it
relates to the world we experience in our daily life. So, in this paper, “marvelous” is used
to designate the nature of the diegetic world in contrast to the world we live in.
7. Freedman also states his difficulties with this passage, and objects that “Brecht is
in no sense a literary realist, not even allowing for the quotation marks” (19). Freedman
seems to understand “realistic” as either a denomination for a historical period or as a
certain style, but neither reading applies to Brecht. This probably is a misunderstanding
on Freedman’s part, since I believe that Suvin is referring to the fact that Brecht’s plays
lack marvelous elements and therefore do not belong to what Suvin calls estranged genres.
8. In recent articles, Suvin not only accepts the idea of emotional, non-rational
cognition (“Cognitive Emotions”), but he also re-evaluates fantasy and comes to an
unexpected conclusion: “Let me therefore revoke, probably to general regret, my blanket
rejection of fantastic fiction. The divide between cognitive (pleasantly useful) and non-
cognitive (useless) does not run between sf and fantastic fiction but inside each—though
in rather different ways and in different proportions, for there are more obstacles to
liberating cognition in the latter” (“Considering” 211). The admission that fantasy and
other fantastic genres can be cognitive as well comes as quite a surprise and poses serious
problems. Ultimately, it renders Suvin’s definition useless, because if both sf and fantastic
fiction are estranged and can be cognitive, there is no way to tell them apart. The problem
here, is, once more, the blending of a proper definition with the desired effect elicited in
a reader and a value judgment. I do not think that what Suvin here wants to say is that
fantasy can appear as this-worldly, or that it naturalizes its marvelous elements (and if so,
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then I have to state that I do not agree with this notion: in most cases, sf and fantasy can
easily be told apart by their mere appearance). In this quotation, “cognition” seems to
mean only the critical reaction a text can provoke in a reader, and Suvin seems to be
acknowledging (at least implicitly) that this has little to do with the definition of a genre
per se. 
9. By “naturalization” I denote a formal process and not the ideological-critical
concept coined by Roland Barthes in Mythologies (1972). 
10. Suvin faults the translation of ostranenie as “defamiliarization” as “somewhat
clumsy” (Metamorphoses 6), but he does not explain why he thinks so. In my opinion, it
is essential to differentiate clearly between Shklovsky’s concept and diegetic
estrangement. Since the German language offers only the term Verfremdung, in my
doctoral thesis I distinguish between diegetischer Verfremdung and ostranenie. However,
as English here has a richer vocabulary, it would be wasteful not to make use of it.
11. See Genette, Narrative Discourse and Narrative Discourse Revisited. 
12. This holds especially true for filmic sf, where non-classical narration is rare. In
written sf, there is much more stylistic variation. Although Golden Age sf is also generally
told in a classical way, with the development of the New Wave a greater stylistic variety
has been introduced into written sf.
13. In this paper, I could only scratch the surface of what I consider to be the essential
mechanism of sf. Much work still needs to be done (parts of which I have done in my
doctoral thesis). Here, I have restricted myself to film, a medium that, for various reasons,
is more conservative than literature. It would be interesting to test whether my
considerations are also valid for movements such as the New Wave or cyberpunk, which
both attempted renewals on a formal level.
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ABSTRACT
The concept of “estrangement” has been central to sf criticism ever since Darko Suvin
defined the genre as creating the effect of “cognitive estrangement.” By going back to the
theories of Viktor Shklovsky and Bertolt Brecht, I will show how Suvin, in his approach,
intermingles formal, fictional, generic, and receptive aspects of estrangement. Contrary
to Suvin’s assessment, it is not sf’s primary formal operation to render familiar things
strange, but to make the alien look ordinary, a process I call naturalization. In sf,
estrangement mainly happens on a diegetic level, when a marvelous element is introduced
into an apparently realistic world. 
